Abstract-Mean field game theory has been developed largely following two routes. One of them, called the direct approach, starts by solving a large-scale game and next derives a set of limiting equations as the population size tends to infinity. The second route is to apply mean field approximations and formalize a fixed point problem by analyzing the best response of a representative player. This paper addresses the connection and difference of the two approaches in a linear quadratic (LQ) setting. We first introduce an asymptotic solvability notion for the direct approach, which means for all sufficiently large population sizes, the corresponding game has a set of feedback Nash strategies in addition to a mild regularity requirement. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic solvability and show that in this case the solution converges to a mean field limit. This is accomplished by developing a re-scaling method to derive a low-dimensional ordinary differential equation (ODE) system, where a non-symmetric Riccati ODE has a central role. We next compare with the fixed point approach which determines a two-point boundary value (TPBV) problem, and show that asymptotic solvability implies feasibility of the fixed point approach, but the converse is not true. We further address non-uniqueness in the fixed point approach and examine the long time behavior of the non-symmetric Riccati ODE in the asymptotic solvability problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
M EAN field game (MFG) theory has undergone a phenomenal growth. It provides a powerful methodology for tackling complexity in large-population noncooperative decision problems. The readers are referred to [4] , [7] , [9] , [12] , [20] for an overview of the theory and applications. The past developments have largely followed two routes [28] , [29] , [36] which are called, respectively, the bottom-up and top-down approaches in [7] .
One route starts by formally solving an N -player game to obtain a large coupled solution equation system. The next step is to derive a limit for the solution by taking N → ∞ [36] , which can be called the direct (or bottom-up) approach; see route one in Fig. 1 . Another route is to solve an optimal control problem of a single agent based on consistent mean field approximations and formalize a fixed point problem to determine the mean field, and this is called the fixed point (or top-down) approach [28] , [29] and also called Nash certainty equivalence in [29] ; see route two in Fig. 1 . The solution of the fixed point problem may be used to design decentralized strategies in the original large but finite population model to achieve an -Nash equilibrium [28] . Under such a set of strategies, each player can further improve little even if it can access centralized information of all players. Compared with Nash strategies determined under centralized information, the above solution has much lower complexity in its computation and implementation.
The reader may consult further literature on the direct approach [9] and the fixed point approach [4] , [5] , [12] , [32] , [37] . Also, see [17] , [34] for the direct approach in a probabilistic framework. We note that the diagram in Fig. 1 displays the basic theoretic framework of mean field games with all players being comparably small, called peers. When the model involves a major player or common noise, the analysis has been extended for the direct approach [10] and the fixed point approach [4] , [8] , [12] , [13] , [27] , [41] .
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is scarce. Their systematic comparison is generally difficult, since in the literature, very often the analysis in each approach is carried out under various sufficient conditions. In this work, we contribute in this direction within the framework of linearquadratic (LQ) mean field games with a finite time horizon. The analysis of mean field games in the LQ setting has attracted substantial interest due to their appealing analytical structure [5] , [8] , [25] , [28] , [37] , [40] , [42] , [48] , [51] , [52] . Specifically, the decentralized strategy of an individual player may be determined in a linear feedback form. Partial state information is considered in [8] , [25] , and [25] adopts linear backward stochastic differential equations (SDEs) to model state dynamics.
In this paper, we first study an asymptotic solvability problem initially introduced in [31] , which may be viewed as an instance of the direct (i.e., bottom-up) approach. We adopt an appropriately defined asymptotic solvability notion for the sequence of LQ games with increasing population sizes so that a neat necessary and sufficient condition can be derived. This will, on the one hand, further our understanding of the direct approach and, on the other, offer a foundation for a thorough comparison with the fixed point approach. We start with an entirely conventional solution of the game by dynamic programming, which leads to a set of coupled Riccati ODEs. It turns out that the necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic solvability is characterized by a low-dimensional non-symmetric Riccati ODE derived by a novel re-scaling technique. The methodology of identifying low-dimensional dynamics to capture essential information on high-dimensional dynamical behavior shares similarity to the statistical physics literature on mean field oscillator models [38] , [43] , [45] . This approach is also closely related to an early problem of mean field social optimization, which studies a highdimensional algebraic Riccati equation (ARE) and uses symmetry for dimension reduction [26, Sec. 6.3] . Other related works include [24] , [44] , [47] . An optimal control problem for a set of symmetric agents with mean field coupling is solved in [24] by a large-scale Riccati ODE, and a mean field limit is derived. An LQ Nash game of infinite time horizon is analyzed in [44] where the number of players increases to infinity. By postulating the strategies of all players and examining the control problem of a fixed player, a family of low-dimensional control problems and their parametrized AREs are solved by applying an implicit function theorem for which sufficient conditions are obtained for large population sizes. The solvability of LQ games with increasing population sizes in the setup of [36] is studied in [47] analyzing 2N coupled steady-state Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) and Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equations under some algebraic conditions, where each player's control is restricted to be local state feedback from the beginning.
Subsequently, the paper investigates the relation of the two fundamental approaches [28] , [29] , [36] shown in Fig. 1 , which has been made possible by the solution of the asymptotic solvability problem. In so doing, we first revisit the fixed point approach for the mean field game, and determine the necessary and sufficient condition for the solvability of the resulting two-point boundary value (TPBV) problem. It is shown that asymptotic solvability provides a sufficient condition for the TPBV problem to be solvable and, in fact, uniquely solvable in this case; this is due to the fact that one can use a non-symmetric Riccati ODE to decouple and solve a general linear TPBV problem [18] . However, there exist scenarios for our TPBV problem to be solvable but asymptotic solvability fails. This suggests non-equivalence of the two approaches in general. We make a further connection with the original work [28] , which applies the fixed point approach under a contraction condition; we show in this case asymptotic solvability holds for the sequence of games.
Our study of the asymptotic solvability problem and the subsequent comparison of the two fundamental approaches provide new insights into the relation between the infinite population mean field game and large finite population games. Historically, the study of the relation between large finite population games and their infinite population limit has been a subject of great interest and importance [1] , [11] , [21] , [23] , [39] although this is usually for static games.
For the TPBV problem in the fixed point approach, we further examine the non-uniqueness issue, which has been of interest in the MFG literature; see non-uniqueness results for nonlinear MFG models [2] , [14] , [19] and for an LQ example with a non-quadratic terminal cost [50] . Non-uniqueness has been well studied in the traditional literature of LQ dynamic games; see [15] , [16] . Finally, we analyze the long time behavior of the nonsymmetric Riccati ODE in the asymptotic solvability problem. The analysis is related to a non-symmetric algebraic Riccati equation (NARE) and faces the issue of solution selection. We introduce the notion of a stabilizing solution for the NARE and derive the necessary and sufficient condition for its existence and uniqueness.
The main contributions of the paper are outlined as follows: 1) We study an N -player LQ Nash game and introduce the notion of asymptotic solvability, which can be regarded as a direct approach in mean field games. 2) By a re-scaling technique, a necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic solvability is obtained in terms of a non-symmetric Riccati ODE. This lays down a foundation to address the exact relation of two fundamental approaches in mean field games: the direct approach and the fixed point approach. We show asymptotic solvability implies unique solvability of the TPBV problem in the fixed point approach. We further show that a contraction condition of the fixed point approach introduced in the original work [28] implies asymptotic solvability. We further determine conditions for non-uniqueness to occur in the fixed point approach.
3) The long time behavior of the non-symmetric Riccati ODE in the direct approach is studied. A necessary and sufficient algebraic condition is obtained for it to have a stabilizing solution. We make some convention on notation. Throughout the paper, E is reserved for denoting the mean of a random variable or a random vector. For symmetric matrix S ≥ 0, we may write x T Sx = |x| 2 S . We denote by 1 k ×l a k × l matrix with all entries equal to 1, by ⊗ the Kronecker product, and by the column vectors {e k 1 , . . . , e k k } the canonical basis of R k . We may use a subscript n to indicate the identity matrix I n to be n × n. For a vector or matrix Z, |Z| stands for its Euclidean norm. For an l × m real matrix Z = (z ij ) 1≤i≤l,1≤j ≤m , denote the l 1 -norm
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the LQ Nash game together with its solution via dynamic programming and Riccati ODEs. Section III presents the necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic solvability and derives decentralized strategies. We revisit the fixed point ap-proach in Section IV and examine its relation to asymptotic solvability. To further study the relation of the two approaches, Section V develops in-depth analysis of the scalar individual state case. The long time behavior of the non-symmetric Riccati ODE is examined in Section VI. Illustrative examples are provided in Section VII. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. LQ NASH GAME
Consider a population of N players (or agents) denoted by A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The state process X i (t) of A i satisfies the following SDE:
where we have state X i ∈ R n , control u i ∈ R n 1 , and the coupling term
with EX i (0) = x i (0) and finite second moment. The N standard n 2 -dimensional Brownian motions {W i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N } are independent and also independent of the initial states. The cost of player A i in the Nash game is given by
The constant matrices (or vectors) Γ, Q, R, Γ f , Q f , η, η f above have compatible dimensions, and we have Q ≥ 0, R > 0, Q f ≥ 0 for these symmetric matrices. For notational simplicity, we only consider constant parameters for the model. Except for long time behavior in Section VI, our analysis and results can be easily extended to the case of time-dependent parameters. Define
Now we write system of SDEs in (1) in the form
Under closed-loop perfect state (CLPS) information, we denote the value function of A i by V i (t, x), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , which corresponds to the initial condition
T and a cost evaluated on [t, T ] in place of (2) . The set of value functions is determined by the system of HJB equations
where
x k and the minimizer is
Next we substitute (5) into (4) to obtain
Denote
and
in a similar form. Suppose V i (t, x) has the following form:
We substitute (8) and (9) into (6) and derive the equation
, such a solution is unique due to the local Lipschitz continuity of the vector field [22] . Taking transpose on both sides of (10) gives an ODE system for P (11)- (12) , and the game of N players has a set of feedback Nash strategies given by
Proof: This theorem follows the standard results in [3, Theorem 6.16, Corollaries 6.5 and 6.12].
By Theorem 1, the solution of the feedback Nash strategies completely reduces to the study of (10) . For this reason, our subsequent analysis starts by analyzing (10).
III. ASYMPTOTIC SOLVABILITY

Definition 2:
The sequence of Nash games (1)- (2) 
Definition 2 only involves the Riccati equations. This is sufficient due to Remark 2. The boundedness condition (13) is to impose certain regularity of the solutions, which is necessary for studying the asymptotic behavior of the system when N → ∞.
Let the Nn × Nn identity matrix be partitioned in the following form:
For 1 ≤ i = j ≤ N , exchanging the ith and jth rows of submatrices in I N n , let J ij denote the resulting matrix. For instance, we have
It is easy to check that
We assume that (10) has a solution (P 1 (t), . . . , P N (t)) on [0, T ]. Then, the following holds.
i) P 1 (t) has the representation
where (13) is equivalent to the following condition:
sup
We present some continuous dependence result of parametrized ODEs in Theorem 4 below. This will play a key role in establishing Theorem 5 later. Consideṙ
We introduce the following assumptions on (16) and (17).
uniformly with respect to (t, ), i.e., for any fixed r > 0, and x, y ∈ B r (0) which is the open ball of radius r centering 0
where Lip(r) depends only on r, not on
(A4) lim →0 |z − z| = 0, and for each fixed r > 0, lim
If the solutions to (16) and (17) 
ii) Suppose there exists a sequence { i , i ≥ 1} where 0 < i ≤ 1 and lim i→∞ i = 0 such that (17) with = i has a solution
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 3:
If (16) and (17) are replaced by matrix ODEs and (or) a terminal condition at T is used in each equation, the results in Theorem 4 still hold.
Let
Before presenting further results, we introduce two Riccati ODEs
Note that (19) is the standard Riccati ODE in LQ optimal control and has a unique solution Λ 1 on [0, T ]. Equation (20) is a nonsymmetric Riccati ODE, where Λ 1 is now treated as a known function. We state the main theorem on asymptotic solvability.
Theorem 5: The sequence of games in (1)- (2) has asymptotic solvability if and only if (20) has a unique solution on
Proof: See Appendix C. We outline the key idea for identifying this necessary and sufficient condition of asymptotic solvability. By Theorem 3 and the ODE of P 1 (t) in (10), we obtain an ODE system of the form ⎡
However, directly taking N → ∞ is not useful because this method, on the one hand, will not generate a meaningful limit of the vector field Ψ N owing to terms such as
3) ) and, on the other, will cause a loss of dynamical information since (Π 2 , Π 3 ) can vanish when N → ∞. Our method is to re-scale by defining
and examine their ODE system. This procedure leads to a new limiting ODE system which can preserve key information about the dynamics of (Π 1 , Π 2 , Π 3 ) and which consists of (19) and (20) together with another equation:
Note that after (19) and (20) 
Proof: The bound follows from Theorem 4 i) by use of g 1 , g 2 , g 3 and the terminal conditions which appear in the equa-
A. Decentralized Control
Proposition 7: Assume that (10) has a solution (P 1 , . . . , P N ) on [0, T ]. Then, the assertions hold: i) S i (t) in (11) has the form
in which the ith sub-vector is θ 1 (t) ∈ R n and the remaining sub-vectors are θ 2 
Proof: See Appendix C. We introduce two ODEs
In fact, (24) and (25) can be derived as the limit of the ODEs satisfied by (χ
Proof: See Appendix C. By Theorem 1, the strategy of player A i is
The closed-loop equation of X i is now given by
To denote the limit of (29) when N → ∞, we introduce the closed-loop mean field dynamics
Proof: By (29)- (30), we find the explicit expression of X (N ) (t) −X(t). The proposition follows from elementary estimates by use of Theorem 6 and Proposition 8.
When N → ∞, from (28), we obtain the control law
which is decentralized sinceX and χ 1 do not depend on the sample path information of other players and can be computed off-line. Suppose Λ 1 and Λ 2 have been given on [0, T ]. Then, (31) can be determined by solving the decoupled ODE system (24) and (30) , which has a unique solution. Note that (24) has its origin in dynamic programming.
IV. RELATION TO THE FIXED POINT APPROACH
The fixed point approach for solving the LQ mean field game consists of two steps (see, e.g., [28] ).
Step 1: (1) and consider the optimal control problem with dynamics and cost
where we set X ∞ i (0) = X i (0). The Brownian motion is the same as in (1) . Applying dynamic programming, the optimal control law is given bŷ
where Λ 1 is solved from (19) anḋ
Step 2:
be determined from the closed-loop system of (32) under the control lawû i and the given X. By the standard consistency requirement in mean field games [28] , we impose
, which amounts to specifying X as a fixed point. This introduces the equation
where X(0) = x 0 and we assume lim N →∞
Combining the ODEs of s and X gives the MFG solution equation system
The equation system (34) is a TPBV problem.
Remark 4:
We introduce in (34) the new notation X instead ofX. It is necessary to maintain this distinction since the two functions coincide only under certain conditions as shown later.
A. Solving the TPBV Problem
The fundamental solution matrix of (34) is determined by the matrix ODE ∂ ∂t
where each submatrix is n × n.
Proposition 10: i) Equation (34) has a solution if and only if
ii) If det Z 1 = 0, (34) has a unique solution.
Proof: i) We introduce s(0) to be determined. By (34) ,
Then, (34) has a solution if and only if there exists s(0) such that
which is equivalent to Z 1 s(0) + Z 2 = 0. This proves part i). ii) This part follows from part i). For illustration, we consider the special case with Γ f = 0, η f = 0. Then, (38) in Proposition 10 i) becomes
B. Direct Approach Solvability Implies Fixed Point Solvability
Theorem 11: Suppose Λ 2 has a solution on [0, T ]. Then, the following holds.
i) Equation (34) has a unique solution (X, s) given by
where (X, χ 1 ) is solved from (24) and (30) in the direct approach. ii) Asymptotic solvability of the sequence of games (1)- (2) implies that (34) has a unique solution.
Proof:
i) For (34), we write
where ϕ is a new unknown function. Now (34) is transformed into a new equation system in terms of (X, ϕ), wherė
The terminal condition ϕ(T ) has been determined from (40) with t = T . We can uniquely solve ϕ and in fact ϕ = χ 1 . Subsequently, we further obtain X =X. It is clear the solution (X, s) is unique. ii) This part follows from Theorem 5 and part i). Let (33) be applied by the N players in (1), and accordingly denoteû
Under the asymptotic solvability condition, the two control lawŝ The existence and uniqueness condition in the TPBV problem is quite different from the condition for asymptotic solvability. It is possible that the Riccati equation of Λ 2 has a finite escape time in [0, T ) but the TPBV problem is still solvable. A detailed comparison will be developed in the next section for scalar models.
C. Fixed Point via a Contraction Mapping
The original analysis in [28] applies the fixed point approach to infinite time horizon LQ mean field games and establishes existence and uniqueness of a solution by specifying a contraction mapping. The procedure in [28] can be applied to (34) to derive a corresponding contraction condition as well. By Theorem 11, asymptotic solvability in the direct approach implies the fixed point solvability, but the converse may not hold (and is indeed not true as it turns out later). Now if the fixed point is determined from a contraction mapping as in [28] , an intriguing question is what is its implication regarding asymptotic solvability. Below we show asymptotic solvability holds in this case.
To facilitate further analysis, we consider (34) on a general interval [t 0 , T ] for t 0 ∈ [0, T ), and rewrite it as follows:
The initial and terminal conditions are given by X(t 0 ) = x t 0 and s(
Denote the linear ODEṡ
where t ∈ [0, T ] and y i (t) ∈ R n . Let Ψ 1 and Ψ 2 be their fundamental solution matrices so that
Following the procedure in [28] , we solve s from the second equation of (42) to obtain
where ζ 1 depends on (η, η f ) but not on X. Substituting (43) into the first equation of (42), we have the expression
where ζ 2 depends on (η, η f ) but not on (X, x t 0 ). Denote the operator
as follows:
Denote the constant
We have the estimate
It is straightforward to check that κ t 0 ≤ κ 0 for all t 0 ∈ [0, T ]. Theorem 12: Suppose κ 0 < 1. Then, asymptotic solvability holds for the sequence of games (1)- (2) .
Proof: We prove by contradiction. Suppose asymptotic solvability does not hold for (1)-(2), which implies Λ 2 has a maximal existence interval (t * , T ] for t * ∈ [0, T ). So there exists a strictly decreasing sequence {t k , k ≥ 1} converging to t * such that lim k →∞ |Λ 2 (t k )| = ∞. We can find an appropriate subsequence, still denoted by {t k , k ≥ 1}, such that for some (î,ĵ), we have lim
where the superscripts indicate the (i, j)-th entry of Λ 2 (t k ).
, and solve a special form of (42) on [t k , T ] as follows:
which has initial condition X * (t k ) = x t k = e n j and terminal condition s
and κ t k ≤ κ 0 , we obtain a unique solution (X * , s (46) and have the bound
In parallel to (43) ,
We may further find a fixed constant C 0 independent of t k such that sup
On the other hand, for each t k appearing in (45) 
)-(2).
Remark 5: We use κ 0 < 1 to ensure a contraction condition for the TPBV problem defined on [0, T ]. It is possible to have improved contraction estimates. Our method here is adequate for addressing the qualitative relation as shown in Theorem 12.
V. THE SCALAR CASE: EXPLICIT SOLUTIONS
A. Riccati Equations of Asymptotic Solvability
We analyze a scalar case of the Riccati ODEs (19) and (20), i.e., n = 1, and suppose B = 0 for the model to be nontrivial. Consider
where Λ 1 (T ) = Q f and Λ 2 (T ) = −Q f Γ f . Without loss of generality, we only deal with the case M = 1 since otherwise a change of variable may be used to convert (19) - (20) to the above form with appropriately modified parameters Q and Q f . Although Λ 1 (t) can be explicitly solved for a general Q f , one usually cannot further solve Λ 2 (t) in a closed form. To overcome this difficulty, we will further take particular choices of the terminal conditions to obtain explicit solutions. Our method is to choose Q f appropriately to solve Λ 1 (t) as a constant so that (49) becomes a Riccati equation with constant coefficients.
In this section, we further suppose the pair (A, √ Q) is detectable. Denote the algebraic Riccati equation Λ 2 1∞ − 2AΛ 1∞ − Q = 0 which gives the stabilizing solution 
To solve (52), let Λ 2 = − u u . Then, (52) leads to u − 2âu +Qu = 0.
(54) DenoteΔ
Proposition 13:
The Riccati ODE (52) i) If 0 <Q ≤â 2 andâ < 0, the solution of (52) is given by
where α = Δ andλ 1 =â + α,λ 2 =â − α are solutions to the characteristic equation of (54). ii) IfQ >â 2 , then
where ifŤ ∈ (0, T ]. Example 1: Consider the system with
It can be verified that the system satisfies (56). The parameters in Example 1 are constructed by first fixing A and Q, and next searching for (G, Γ) subject to the two constraints in (56).
B. The TPBV Problem and Non-uniqueness
For the scalar case n = 1, we take M = 1 and Q f = Λ 1∞ so that Λ 1 = Λ 1∞ . Then, (35) reduces to the form
(57) which has the characteristic polynomial
Note that for the TPBV problem (34) in the fixed point approach to have multiple solutions, a necessary condition is that asymptotic solvability fails by Theorem 11. For constructing non-uniqueness results, below we largely impose conditions in Proposition 14 i). IfΔ > 0 (58) |λI − A ∞ | = 0 has the real-valued solutions
Restricting our attention to two distinct real roots will streamline the presentation in constructing non-uniqueness examples. Under (58), denote
T , k= 1, 2. corresponding to the eigenvalues λ 1 and λ 2 , respectively. Now for (36), we have
as a 2 × 2 matrix function. We further calculate
Given the parameters in (51), (34) becomes
where X(0) = x 0 and s(T ) = −Λ 1∞ η f . In order to construct models with non-uniqueness results, here we treat T and x 0 in (61) as adjustable parameters. since Φ 21 (T , 0) = 0. We calculate
Now for the scalar case with M = 1, Q f = Λ 1∞ , Γ f = 0 and T =T , (61) specializes to the TPBV problem where X(0) =x 0 and s(T ) = −Λ 1∞ η f . Proposition 16: Assume (51) and (56) hold. Then, a solution (X, s) of (64) can be obtained by taking any initial condition s(0). Therefore, (64) has an infinite number of solutions.
Proof: Recalling (39), (64) is solvable if and only if one can find s(0) to satisfy
By (63) 
C. Comparison of Two Approaches
Consider the system given by Example 1 with time horizon [0, T ]. It satisfies (56). Then,Ť =T .
If we take T ∈ (0,T ), then asymptotic solvability holds and the TPBV problem (61) has a unique solution by Theorem 11.
If T =T , then Λ 2 has a finite escape time at t = 0 implying no asymptotic solvability. However, in this case, the TPBV problem (64) has an infinite number of solutions, which in turn can be used to construct an infinite number of -Nash equilibria for the N -player game.
If T >T , asymptotic solvability fails but (61) has a unique solution since Φ 22 (T, 0) = 0 by Proposition 15.
Based on Theorems 11 and 12, and the comparison above, the relation between the two approaches is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The rectangle region represents models satisfying the contraction condition κ 0 < 1 in Theorem 12.
VI. LONG TIME BEHAVIOR
For this section, we make the following assumption: (H1) The pair (A, B) is stabilizable, and the pair (A, Q 1 2 ) is detectable.
Within the setup of continuous time dynamical systems, a matrix Z ∈ R k ×k is called stable or Hurwitz if all its eigenvalues have a strictly negative real part.
A. Steady-State Form of Riccati ODEs
For (19), we introduce the ARE
Note that under (H1), there exists a unique solution Λ 1∞ ≥ 0 from the class of positive semi-definite matrices. Corresponding to (20) , we introduce the algebraic equation
which is a NARE. When (66) has a solution in R n ×n , it is possible that multiple such solutions exist. The question is how to determine a solution of interest, and this amounts to imposing appropriate constraints on the solution. For related methods on choosing a desirable solution of NAREs by fulfilling some stability conditions, see [33] .
B. Stabilizing Solution
Suppose Λ 2∞ ∈ R n ×n is a solution to (66). Denote
To motivate the restrictions to be imposed on Λ 2∞ , we examine the two ODEs (24) and (30), where the latter is the closed-loop mean field dynamics. We start by checking the stability of the solution of (24) when t is simply allowed to tend to −∞. If Λ 2 (t) can converge to a limit Λ 2∞ at all, it is well justified to study the stability of the limiting ODĖ
which is constructed by replacing (Λ 1 (t), Λ 2 (t)) by (Λ 1∞ , Λ 2∞ ) in (24) . The solution of (69) converges to a constant vector χ 1∞ as t → −∞ if A M is Hurwitz. Thus, the generation of stable long time behavior suggests we impose a stability condition on A M . For (30), we similarly introduce a limiting ODE of the form
and further introduce a stability condition on A G in order to have a stable solution. Definition 17: Λ 2∞ ∈ R n ×n is called a stabilizing solution of (66) if it satisfies (66) and both A G and A M are Hurwitz.
If Λ 2∞ is a stabilizing solution, it has the interpretation as a locally stable equilibrium point of the Riccati ODE (20) . We take a limiting form of (20) by replacing Λ 1 by Λ 1∞ , and for convenience of analysis, next reverse time to obtain the new equatioṅ
for which we take a general initial condition Y (0). The linearized ODE for (71) around Λ 2∞ iṡ We proceed to determine conditions for existence of a stabilizing solution. Denote
which may be viewed as a steady-state form of A(t) in (35) .
l×l where V ∈ R k ×l and span{V } = V . If A o is Hurwitz, V is called a stable invariant subspace. Below we give some standard definitions related to structural properties of an invariant subspace (see, e.g., [6] , [35] 
We introduce the following condition on A ∞ : (H g ) The eigenvalues of A ∞ are strong (n, n) c-splitting and the associated n-dimensional stable invariant subspace is a graph subspace.
Theorem 18:
i) The NARE (66) has a stabilizing solution Λ 2∞ if and only if (H g ) holds. ii) If (H g ) holds, (66) has a unique stabilizing solution.
Proof: i)
Step 1: To show necessity, suppose that Λ 2∞ is a stabilizing solution. Denote
Since (66) holds, it can be checked that span the n-dimensional stable invariant subspace of A ∞ as a graph subspace.
Step 2: We continue to show sufficiency. Suppose the columns of the matrix
span the n-dimensional stable invariant subspace of A ∞ , where U 1 is invertible. We take 
By
Step 1, span{Y } = span{Ȳ } since they both are equal to the n-dimensional stable invariant subspace of A ∞ . Now for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the ith column Y i of Y is in span{Ȳ }, which further implies that Y i is equal to the ith column ofȲ . Therefore, Λ 2∞ =Λ 2∞ , and uniqueness follows. Theorem 18 presents a qualitative criterion on the existence of a stabilizing solution to the NARE (66).
Step 2 in the proof further provides a computational procedure. When (H g ) holds, one may choose any n basis vectors of the n-dimensional stable invariant subspace to form the matrix in (74) and the resulting matrix U 1 ∈ R n ×n is necessarily invertible. Subsequently, one uses (75) to find the stabilizing solution. In fact, there is a simple means to test whether (H g ) holds. If the eigenvalues of A ∞ are strong (n, n) c-splitting, one takes any n basis vectors of the stable invariant subspace to form a matrix as in (74) with U 1 to be further checked. Finally, if U 1 is invertible, (H g ) holds; and (H g ) fails otherwise.
VII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. Asymptotic Solvability
Consider the Riccati ODEs (19) and (20) Example 3: Take Q f = 0 and T = 3. All other parameters are the same as in Example 2. Now (19) and (20) 
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates an asymptotic solvability problem in LQ mean field games, and studies its connection with the fixed point approach which involves a TPBV problem. For asymptotic solvability, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition via a non-symmetric Riccati ODE. It is shown that asymptotic solvability provides a sufficient condition for the TPBV problem in the fixed point approach to have a unique solution. We identify situations for the TPBV problem to be solvable or have multiple solutions when asymptotic solvability does not hold. The long time behavior of the non-symmetric Riccati ODE in the asymptotic solvability problem is addressed by studying the stabilizing solution to a non-symmetric algebraic Riccati equation.
The re-scaling technique used in studying asymptotic solvability can be extended to more general models in terms of dynamics, interaction, and information patterns [8] , [25] , [27] , [30] . This will be reported in our future work.
APPENDIX A
A. Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma A.1: We assume that (10) has a solution (P 1 (t), . . . , P N (t)) on [0, T ]. Then, the following holds. i) P 1 (t) has the representation
where Π 1 , Π 3 , and Π 4 are n × n symmetric matrices. ii) For i > 1,
Hence, for i = 2, 3, (10) as (P 1 (t), . . . , P N (t)) does.
is an n × n matrix. By Step 1, P 1 = J Repeating the above procedure by using J 2k , k ≥ 4, in place of J 23 , we obtain P
We similarly obtain P 1 = J T 34 P 1 J 34 , and this gives P Repeating a similar argument, we can check all other remaining off-diagonal submatrices. Since P 1 is symmetric (also see Remark 1), (P 1 is symmetric by (A.2). By the above method, we can show that the off-diagonal submatrices P ij 1 , where i = j and 2 ≤ i ≤ N , 2 ≤ j ≤ N , are equal and symmetric. Therefore, we obtain the representation of P 1 .
Step 3: We can verify that (J 
The last two ODEs lead to
where 
APPENDIX C
A. Proof of Theorem 5
Taking Π 3 = Π 4 into account, we rewrite the system of (A. In particular, we can determine
The expressions of g 2 and g 3 can be determined in a similar way and the detail is omitted here.
Letting N → ∞ in (C.1)-(C.3), this gives a limiting ODE system consisting of (19) , (20) , and (22) .
If (20) has a unique solution on [0, T ], we can uniquely solve Λ 3 from a linear ODE (22) . In view of g 1 , g 2 , g 3 
APPENDIX D
A. Proof of Proposition 13
i) IfQ ≤ 0, (52) is the Riccati ODE in a standard optimal control problem [49] , and so has a unique solution on [0, T ].
ii) The characteristic equation of (54) has solutionsλ 1 = a + α,λ 2 =â − α, where α = Δ .
If α > 0, we write u = 
B. Proof of Proposition 14
i) The computation is similar to the case in Proposition 13 and we omit the details. ii) The characteristic equation of (54) has solutionsλ 1,2 = a ± βi. To solve (54), we take u = C 1 eâ t cos βt + eâ t sin βt. Now u =âeâ t (C 1 cos βt + sin βt) + βeâ t (−C 1 sin βt + cos βt).
Since Λ 2 (T ) = 0, we determine C 1 =â sin βT + β cos βT −â cos βT + β sin βT = cos θ sin βT + sin θ cos βT − cos θ cos βT + sin θ sin βT = − sin(βT + θ) cos(βT + θ) .
For this moment, we suppose cos(βT + θ) = 0 so that C 1 above is well defined. Subsequently, If cos(βT + θ) = 0 occurs, we start by taking u = eâ t cos βt + C 2 eâ t sin βt. We may determine C 2 = 0 and still obtain the same form of Λ 2 as in (D.1).
